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PROHIBITING THE SOLICITATION OF ABORTIONVIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER FREE
SPEECH PROBLEMS: WILL FREE SPEECH
GUARANTEES BE A CASUALTY OF THE MORAL
DEBATE ON ABORTION?
William J. Swiftt

INTRODUCTION

I.

On March 19, 1990, the Governor of Guam signed into law
Public Law 20-134. 1 Under threat of criminal sanctions, the statute
prohibited abortion in all circumstances except when necessary to
save a woman's life or to prevent grave impairment to her health. 2

t

B.S.W., 1980, Creighton University, J.D. cum laude, 1986, St. Louis University.
Law clerk to the Honorable Albert L. Rendlen, 1986-87, Supreme Court of
Missouri. Presently employed with the Appellate Division of the Missouri State
Public Defender. I wish to thank my wife Melinda for her assistance, support,
and encouragement in the writing of this article.
1. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422,
1423-25 (D. Guam 1990) (Guam I).
2. [d. at 1424. Public Law 20-134 was presented to the Governor for signature
as Bill No. 848. The Bill, in its entirety, provided:
AN ACT TO REPEAL AND REENACT § 31.20 OF TITLE 9,
GUAM CODE ANNOTATED, TO REPEAL §§ 31.21 AND 31.22
THEREOF, TO ADD 31.23 THERETO, TO REPEAL SUBSECTION
14 OF SECTION 3107 OF TITLE 10, GUAM CODE ANNOTATED,
RELATIVE TO ABORTIONS, AND TO CONDUCT A REFERENDUM THEREON. BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE
TERRITORY OF GUAM:
Section 1. Legislative findings. The Legislature finds that for purposes
of this Act life of every human being begins at conception, and that
unborn children have protectible interests in life, health, and wellbeing. The purpose of this Act is to protect the unborn children of
Guam. As used in this declaration of findings the term "unborn
children" includes any and all unborn offspring of human beings
from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological
development.
Section 2. § 31.20 of Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, is repealed and
reenacted to read:
"§ 31.20. Abortion: defined. "Abortion" means the purposeful termination of a human pregnancy after implantation of a fertilized
ovum by any person including the pregnant woman herself with an
intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead
unborn fetus. "Abortion" does not mean the medical intervention in
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In addition to prohibiting elective abortions, the law declared it a
(i) ectopic pregnancy, or (ii) in a pregnancy at any time after the
commencement of pregnancy if two (2) physicians who practice independently of each other reasonably deterD;line using all available
means that there is a substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy
would endanger the life of the mother or would gravely impair the
health of the mother, any such termination of pregnancy to be
subsequently reviewed by a peer review committee designated by the
Guam Medical Licensure Board, and in either case such an operation
is performed by a physician licensed to practice medicine in Guam or
by a physician practicing medicine in the employ of the government
of the United States, in an adequately equipped medical clinic or in
a hospital approved or operated by the government of the United
States or of Guam."
Section 3. § 31.21 of Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, is repealed and
reenacted to read:
"§ 31.21. Providing or administering drug or employing means to
cause an abortion. Every person who provides, supplies, or administers
to any woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine, drug,
or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or other means
whatever, with intent thereby to cause an abortion of such woman as
defined in § 31.20 of this Title is guilty of a third degree felony. In
addition, if such person is a licensed physician, the Guam Medical
Licensure Board shall take appropriate disciplinary action."
Section 4. § 31.22 of Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, is repealed and
reenacted to read:
"§ 31.22. Soliciting and taking drug or submitting to an attempt to
cause an abortion. Every woman who solicits of any person any
medicine, drug, or substance whatever, and takes the same, or who
submits to any operation, or to the use of any means whatever with
intent thereby to cause an abortion as defined in § 31.20 of this Title
is guilty of a misdemeanor."
Section 5. A new § 31.23 is added to Title 9, Guam Code Annotated,
to read:
"§ 31.23. Soliciting to submit to operation, etc., to cause an abortion.
Every person who solicits any woman to submit to any operation, or
to the use of any means whatever, to cause an abortion as defined in
§ 31.20 of this Title is guilty of a misdemeanor."
Section 6. Subsection 14 of Section 3107, "Title 10, Guam Code
Annotated, is repealed.
Section 7. Abortion referendum. (a) There shall be submitted to an
island-wide general election to be held on November 6, 1990, the
following question for determination by the qualified voters of Guam,
the question to appear on the ballot in English and Chamorro: "Shall
that public law derived from Bill 848, Twentieth Guam Legislature
(P.L. 20-134), which outlawed abortion except in the cases of pregnancies threatening the life of the mother be repealed?"
In the event a majority of those voting vote "Yes", such public law
shall be repealed in its entirety as of December I, 1990.
(b) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Election
Commission (the "Commission") sufficient funds to carry out the
referendum described in this Section 7, including but not limited to
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misdemeanor to solicit any woman to have an abortion. The law
pronounced that:
[e]very person who solicits any woman to submit to any
operation, or to the use of any means whatever, to cause
an abortion as defined in § 31.20 of this Title is guilty of
a misdemeanor. 3
During a 1990 speech before the Guam Press Club, Janet Benshoof, the director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Reproductive Freedom Project, acknowledged that Guam's law prohibited
the solicitation of abortions, but -she nonetheless apprised the audience that elective abortions remained legal in the State of Hawaii. 4
Also, she provided a telephone number with which to obtain additional information about the availability of abortion in Hawaii. s Ms.
Benshoof was subsequently charged with violating the law's solicitation provision. 6
In Roe v. Wade,7 the United States Supreme Court found that
the qualified right to obtain an abortion was a fundamental right. 8
Premised upon the right to privacy that is embraced within the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal
liberty, this fundamental right could be limited only by a compelling
state interest. 9
In the more recent decision Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,1O and previously in the plurality opinion of
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,lI the Court has disavowed
the fundamental right characterization, while describing the right as

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.
11.

the cost of printing the ballot and tabulating the results. In preparing
the ballot, the Commission shall include in the question the number
of the relevant public law.
Id. at 1423-25. The scheduled referendum was not held because of the district
court's ruling. See Appellant's Brief at 4, Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.) (Guam II), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 633 (1992).
See Guam II, 962 F.2d at 1368 n.1.
Guam I, 776 F. Supp. at 1426; see also Tamar Lewin, A.C.L. U. Lawyer Runs
Afoul Of Guam's New Abortion Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1990, at A24.
Id.
Guam I, 776 F. Supp. at 1426. The charges were, however, subsequently
dismissed without prejudice, apparently in response to the district court issuing
a preliminary injunction in Guam I. See Plaintiffs' Brief at 71 n.73, Guam I,
776 F. Supp. 1422 (D. Guam 1990). It was assumed by the plaintiffs that the
charges could be reinstated if the district court's injunction was ever lifted. Id.
410 U.S. 113, reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
See id. at 153-55.
Id.
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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merely a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 12 The
plurality opinion in Webster was especially significant because it
"invited" states to impose more restrictions on the exercise of
abortion rights. 13 Cognizant of the shifting composition of the Court
and its implications for the future guarding of privacy interests, 14
particularly in the area of abortion rights, IS the Government of Guam

12. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804-05 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
11.); ide at 2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and dissenting); see Webster,
492 U.S. af 520 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
13. Webster, 492 U.S. at 556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's dissent
in Webster noted:
It is impossible to read the plurality opinion and especially its final
paragraph, without recognizing its implicit invitation to every State to
enact more and more restrictive abortion laws, and to assert their
interest in potential life as of the moment of conception. All these
laws will satisfy the plurality's nonscrutiny, until sometime, a new
regime of old dissenters and new appointees will declare what the
plurality intends: that Roe is no longer good law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
14. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 27780, 287-89 (1990) (opinions of Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court and O'Connor,
J., concurring) (holding that right to withdraw treatment from an incompetent
person was a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, requiring a
balancing of the liberty interests against relevant state interests); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) (holding that there was no fundamental
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause to engage in consensual homosexual activity). But see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 304-05, 339-46 (opinions of
Brennan and Stevens, 11., dissenting) (finding right to withdraw treatment of
incompetent was a fundamental liberty interest that could be suspended only
by a compelling state interest); Bowers, 478 U.S. at 202, 206, 208, 216 (opinions
of Blackmun and Stevens, 11., dissenting) (finding right to privacy grounded
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompassed an
individual's right to control the nature of his intimate associations).
15. In Casey, Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy authored a joint opinion
which stated that the Court was adhering to the essential holding of Roe.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804, 2816-17. While so commenting, the joint opinion
indicated that restrictions on abortion were to be evaluated according to an
"undue burden" inquiry. Id. at 2819-20. An undue burden was defined as one
which imposed "a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id. at 2820. Until Webster, abortion restrictions
were subject to the more rigorous strict scrutiny review which required the
advancement of a compelling state interest. Id. at 2844-47 n.l (Blackmun, J.,
concurring and dissenting); ide at 2855,2860,2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
Although the joint opinion in Casey reaffirmed Roe's central holding, see
ide at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting), four other members of
the Court would have voted to overrule Roe. Id. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting). The willingness of four members of the Court to
overturn Roe prompted Justice Blackmun to observe: "I fear for the darkness
as four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to extinguish the
light." Id. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). To that obser-
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accepted Webster's "invitation" by enacting a law intended to provide the Court with the opportunity to explicitly overrule Roe. 16
Guam's entire abortion-prohibition statute was found unconstitutional by the District Court of Guam, which noted in particular
that the solicitation provision violated the First Amendment. 17 While
the Government of Guam did not appeal the invalidation of the
solicitation provision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision as to those portions of the law that the government of Guam did appeal. lS
This Article will confine its focus to the First Amendment free
speech concerns presented by laws prohibiting the solicitation of
abortion. 19 Prohibiting the solicitation of abortion strikes at the core
values of the First Amendment because it discriminates on the basis
of viewpoint. Such viewpoint-based discrimination prohibits anyone
from furnishing women with information that is supportive or favorable to the exercise of the abortion option, but does not prohibit
anyone from providing women with information that encourages or
promotes carrying their pregnancies to term. The fact that efforts to
prohibit the solicitation of abortion have not been confined to Guam
evidences a climate in which the free speech guarantees of the First

16.
17.
18.

19.

vation, Justice Blackmun concluded his opinion by adding:
In one sense, the Court's approach is worlds apart from that of THE
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE SCALIA. And yet, in another sense,
the distance between the two approaches is short-the distance is but
a single vote.
I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when
I do step down, the confirmation process for my successor well may
focus on the issue before us today. That, I regret, may be exactly
where the choice between the two worlds will be made.
Id. at 2854-55.
See Don J. DeBenedictis, Two Abortion Laws Struck Down, 76 A.B.A. J. 20,
20-21 (Nov. 1990).
Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422,
1428, 1429 n.9 (D. Guam 1990) (Guam I).
See Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1369
n.2 (9th Cir.) (Guam II), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992).
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech .... "). The First Amendment is applicable to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
In 1968 Congress amended the Organic Act of Guam, 48 U.S.C. §§ 14211428, adding 48 U.S.C. § 1421 b(u), which extended particular provisions and
amendments of the United States Constitution, including the First Amendment,
to Guam. Guam I, 776 F. Supp. at 1426-28. Before invalidating the Guam
law, both the district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that Congress did not intend 48 U.S.C.
§ 1421 b(u) to mandate that the rights recognized in Roe also be extended to
the people of Guam. Id.; see also Guam II, 962 F.2d at 1370.
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Amendment have been targeted by abortion foes in their efforts to
outlaw abortion.
Prohibiting speech of the sort employed by Ms. Benshoof would,
however, run afoul of the First Amendment even if the Court were
to abandon Roe. 20 This is so because the prohibited speech does not
constitute incitement that would likely culminate in immediate lawless
conduct.
Additionally, speech similar to that uttered by Ms. Benshoof
cannot be forbidden under the First Amendment because the government may not punish a speaker for discussing prohibited sorts of
behavior. Finally, Ms. Benshoof's speech could not be prohibited
because the government cannot ban dissemination of information
within one jurisdiction relating to an activity that is prohibited by
that jurisdiction, but that is legal in another. The multiple problems
posed by prohibiting the solicitation of abortion must be considered
in light of the values underlying the First Amendment and the Court's
precedent addressing viewpoint discrimination.
II. THE VALVES VNDERL YING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE PROHIBITION AGAINST VIEWPOINT
DISCRIMINATION
Three purposes commonly associated with the First Amendment
are: (1) to permit informed choices by citizens in a self-governing
democracy; (2) to further the search for truth; and (3) to allow each
individual to develop and exercise his or her capacities, thereby
promoting a sense of self-worth.21 The preeminent exponent of the
"self-government purpose" was Professor Alexander Meiklejohn,
who observed that "[t]he freedom that the First Amendment protects
is not ... an absence of regulation. It is the presence of self-

20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia, in Planned Parenthood
oj Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, urged the Court to get out of the
"abortion-umpiring business." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2882, 2885 (Scalia, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that even if the Court
were to abdicate its constitutional responsibility as suggested by Justice Scalia,
it would still be necessary for the Court to review abortion related issues, such
as the extent to which government could, consistent with the First Amendment,
limit speech dealing with abortion. [d. at 2854 n.12 (Blackmun, J., concurring
and dissenting) (posing question of whether states that choose not to criminalize
abortion could ban all advertising providing information about where and how
to obtain abortions).
21. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment,
43 U. Cm. L. REV. 20, 23-26 (1975). Thoughtful writing on the values
underlying the First Amendment abounds. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 193 n.8
(1983) (citing numerous authorities).
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government. "22 In Professor Meiklejohn's view, the First Amendment
does not protect a "freedom to speak," but rather protects those
activities of thought and communication by which we govern. 23 This
view is premised on the fact that the people created a form of
government whereby they granted only some powers to the state and
federal governments, while reserving very significant powers of government to themselves.24 Freedom of speech is essential to the vitality
of our constitutional democracy because the people have chosen to
govern themselves rather than to be governed. 2s In order for selfgovernment to exist, however, "the voters must acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general
welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express."26 For
Professor Meiklejohn, freedom of expression is an absolute in the
realm of public affairsY
The "search for the truth" purpose was highlighted by Justice
Holmes in his frequently quoted dissent in Abrams v. United States. 28
Justice Holmes stated that "the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market .... "29 For society to advance in knowledge, it is believed

22. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP.
CT. REv. 245, 252.
23. Id. at 255.
24. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation
of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1, 11 (1965).
25. See Meiklejohn, supra note 22, at 263; see also Brennan, supra note 24, at 11
(discussing Meiklejohn's First Amendment theory). James Madison shared
Professor Meiklejohn's view of the First Amendment, observing "'that the
censorial power is in the people over the Government and not in the Government
over the people.'" Id. at 15 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 934 (1794».
26. See Meiklejohn, supra note 22, at 255.
27. See Brennan, supra note 24, at 12.
28. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (involving prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1918
for statements critical of the Government made during World War I).
29. Id. at 630. John Stuart Mill similarly observed:
Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the
very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes
of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties
have any rational assurance of being right.
See Karst, supra note 21, at 25 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty (1859),
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL 207-08 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1961».
Professor Meiklejohn has disavowed any affinity for the "search for the truth"
purpose of the First Amendment, his pessimism concerning the notion that
truth will ultimately prevail is evident from the statement: "I have never been
able to share the Miltonian faith that in a fair fight between truth and error,
truth is sure to win." See Meiklejohn, supra note 22, at 262-63; see also
Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 284 n.314 (1989) (citing authorities critical of
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that there must be unfettered competition between those views that
predominate and those that depart from the mainstream. 30 The search
for truth demands protection of all views, especially unpopular ones.3'
While Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams espoused the "search
for the truth" purpose, Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v.
Californian focused on the goal of promoting individual self-worth.
Justice Brandeis noted that "[t]hose who won our independence
believed that the final end of the state was to make men free to
develop their faculties .... "33 Without freedom of speech, individuals
are unable to realize their capacities. 34
A law that substantially impairs the communication of a particular viewpoint violates the First Amendment because by removing a
particular message from public debate it mutilates "the thinking
process of the community," and therefore is incompatible with the
values sought to be fostered by the First Amendment. 3s Viewpoint
restrictions do not harmonize with the notion that there should be
"equality of status in the field of ideas," so that all ideas dealing
with a particular subject of public concern are accorded the same
privileges. 36 Because viewpoint discrimination implicates core First
Amendment values, the government, when contemplating establishing

30.
31.

32.

33.
34.
35.
36.

the assumption that the existence of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
necessarily results in truth prevailing). Professor Ingber also has argued that
the existence of a free marketplace of ideas does not insure that the truth will
predominate, but instead the marketplace "serves as a forum where cultural
groups with differing needs, interests, ana experiences battle to defend or
establish their disparate senses of what is 'true' or 'best.'" Stanley Ingber, The
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 27.
See Karst, supra note 21, at 25.
Id.
274 U.S. 357 (1927) (involving prosecution under the California Criminal
Syndicalism Act for activities in the Communist party).
Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
See Karst, supra note 21, at 26.
See Stone, supra note 21, at 198 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM 27 (1960».
See Paul B. Stephan, III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination,
68 VA. L. REv. 203, 233 n.136 (1982) (quoting and discussing ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960». John Stuart Mill made an insightful comment condemning efforts directed at suppressing disfavored viewpoints:
"If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of
the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that
one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing
mankind." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 18 (David Spitz ed. 1975); cf.
City Of Madison Joint School Dist. No.8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976) (stating that to permit one side of a
debata.ble public question to have a monopoly in express1ng its views is the
antithesis of constitutional guarantees).
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viewpoint-based regulation, must be sure to fashion a precisely drawn
means of advancing a compelling governmental interest. 37
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of viewpoint discrimination in Cornelius v. NAA CP Legal Defense & Education Fund,
Inc. 38 All of the plaintiffs in Cornelius were organizations that
attempted to influence public policy through one or more of the
following activities: political activity, advocacy, lobbying, and litigation on behalf of others. 39 At issue was an Executive Order that
excluded "[a]gencies that seek to influence the outcomes of elections
or the determination of public policy through political activity or
advocacy, lobbying, or litigation on behalf of parties other than
themselves" from participating in the Combined Federal Campaign,
a charity appeal directed at federal employees. 40 Justice O'Connor
found that the Combined Federal Campaign was a non-public forum
and that the restriction did not violate the First Amendment because
. it was viewpoint-neutra1. 41 Although the Court upheld the restriction,
the cause was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether
the viewpoint-neutral restriction was in fact "a facade for viewpointbased discrimination.' '42
Justice Blackmun, who was not persuaded by the government's
contention that the restriction was viewpoint-neutral because it applied equally to all advocacy groups regardless of their political or
philosophical predispositions,43 dissented in Cornelius on the grounds
that the restriction, on its face, discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. 44 Justice Blackmun viewed the relevant comparison not as
between the individual organizations that composed the excluded
group, but rather between the organizations allowed access to the
campaign and those denied access. 4S The fact that government em37. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 66 (1983)
(Brennan, J.,_ dissenting) (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servo
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980».
38. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
39. [d. at 793. The plaintiffs in Cornelius were: the NAACP Legal Defense and
Education Fund, the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, the Puerto Rican Legal
Defense and Education Fund, the Federally Employed Women Legal Defense
and Education Fund, the Indian Law Resource Center, the Lawyer's Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Natural Resources Defense Council. [d.
40. [d. at 790, 795.
41. [d. at 810-11.
42. [d. at 811-13.
43. [d. at 832 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. [d. at 814. Justice Blackmun emphasized that even in a non-public forum
government- cannot discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint. [d.
at 819. Justice Stevens, in his Cornelius dissent, stated that he did not consider
the precise characterization of the forum to be helpful in arriving at a result.
[d. at 833 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. [d. at 832 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ployees could hear from only those charities of the opinion that
charitable goals can best be achieved within the framework of existing
social policy and the status quo was viewed as "blatantly" viewpoint
based. 46
On two recent occasions, the Court has addressed the constitutionality of flag desecration laws. In Texas v. Johnson,47 Johnson
was convicted of desecrating an American flag in violation of Texas
law. 48 During the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas,
Johnson participated in a political demonstration protesting Reagan
administration policies. 49 The demonstration concluded with Johnson
setting fire to an American flag. so
The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the First
Amendment because a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment is that government cannot prohibit the expression of ideas
merely because society may find them offensive or disagreeableY
Likewise, government cannot prohibit expression because it disagrees
with the message intended to be conveyedY The statute conflicted
with the notion that the best test of the truth is the ability of the
thought to be accepted in the marketplace of ideas. s3

46. Id. at 833.
47. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
48. Id. at 399.
49.Id.
50.Id.
51. Id. at 414; see also Forsyth County v. The Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct.
2395, 2404 (1992) (holding that speech cannot be financially burdened any
more than it can be punished or banned simply because it may offend a hostile
mob); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (finding the fact that society
may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason to suppress, but rather
reason to afford it constitutional protection), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965) (stating that the function of
free speech is to invite dispute and it may best serve its high purpose when it
induces unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or stirs
people to anger).
52. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 416; see also Forsyth County, 112 S. Ct. at 2403 (absence
of standards for assessing permit fees allowed administrator to encourage some
views and discourage others through arbitrary application of fees).
53. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 418. In the context of discussing the search for the
truth value, the Court commented that the First Amendment does not guarantee
other concepts regarded as virtually sacred, such as the principle that race
discrimination is odious and destructive, from being subjected to the test of
the marketplace of ideas. [d. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969». Accord R.A.V. v. City of S1. Paul, 112 S. C1. 2538, 2547-48 (1992)
(prosecution for burning cross on African-American family's yard under BiasMotivated Crime Ordinance was viewpoint based) (see infra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text for further discussion); Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85,
87-90 (2d Cir. 1992) (creation of alternative class sections and threat of future
discipline in response to professor's writings containing denigrating comments
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One of the interests asserted by the State of Texas in defending
Johnson's conviction was the preservation of the flag as a symbol
of national unity. 54 The Court rejected the preservation argument,
noting that Johnson was prosecuted for expressing dissatisfaction
with his country's policies - expression situated at the core of First
Amendment values. 55 The Court went on to add: "To conclude that
the Government may permit designated symbols to be used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory
having no discernible or defensible boundaries. "56 The Court indicated that the way to preserve the flag's special significance is not
to punish those who feel differently, but rather to persuade them
that they are wrong. 57 While advocating persuasion, the Court quoted
from Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. California: "If
there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies,
to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. "58
In response to the Court's decision in Johnson, Congress passed
the Flag Protection Act of 1989, which became the subject of the
Court's opinion in United States v. Eichman. 59 As in Johnson, the

54.
55.
56.

57.
58.
59.

regarding the intelligence and social characteristics of African-Americans violated the First Amendment); Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George
Mason Univ., 773 F. Supp. 792, 793, 795 (E.D. Va. 1991) (discipline imposed
on fraternity for skit containing offensive racial and sexual stereotypes violated
First Amendment because the First Amendment does not recognize exceptions
for bigotry, racism, religious intolerance, or matters some view as trivial,
vulgar, or profane); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1168-81 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (University's rule
authorizing discipline for comments, epithets, or other expressive behavior or
physical conduct that intentionally demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry, or age violates the
overbreadth doctrine).
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 400. The other interest was the prevention of breaches
of the peace. [d.; see infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411.
[d. at 417 (emphasis added). Professor Ely has written a definitive article on
the First Amendment and flag desecration. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration:
A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975). Statutes aimed at protecting the flag's
symbolism and that prohibit acts such as flag burning discriminate on the basis
of viewpoint because they "proscribe only ideologically charged acts, and
beyond that, only acts charged with a particular set of ideological outlooks."
[d. at 1502~03.
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 419.
[d. (quoting Whitney v. Cali/ornia, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring».
496 U.S. 310 (1990). The Flag Protection Act, in relevant part, provided:
(a)(l) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns,
maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the
United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not
more than one year, or both.
[d. at 314.
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defendants in Eichman were prosecuted for setting American flags
aJire. 60 Relying extensively on its opinion in Johnson, the Court held
that the Act, which it found to be insufficiently distinct from Texas'
statute, violated the First Amendment. 61
The Court's most recent pronouncement on viewpoint discrimination occurred in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul. 62 In that case, the
defendant was charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance, which prohibited placing on public or private property
certain items likely to arouse anger, alarm, or resentment on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender. 63 It was alleged that
the defendant had violated the Ordinance by burning a cross in the
yard of an African-American family. 64 The Court held that the
ordinance violated the First Amendment's prohibition against viewpoint discrimination because it applied only to speech which aroused
intense emotions based upon race, color, creed, religion, or gender. 65
In light of the values underlying the First Amendment and the
prohibition against viewpoint discrimination, the remaining question
is whether prohibiting the solicitation of abortion violates the First
Amendment.
III.

PROHIBITING THE SOLICITATION OF ABORTION

A.

Viewpoint Discrimination

Prohibiting the solicitation of abortion is viewpoint based discrimination that contravenes the purposes animating the First Amend-

60. [d. at 312. The defendants in Appeal No. 89-1433 set fire to several flags on
the steps of the Capitol while protesting various aspects of the Government's
domestic and foreign policy. [d. The defendants in Appeal No. 89-1434 set
fire to a flag while protesting the passage of the Flag Protection Act. [d.
61. [d. at 315-18. The Court declined to accept the Government's invitation to
reconsider Johnson in light of what was contended to be Congress' recent
recognition of a national consensus opposing flag burning. [d. at 318.
62. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
63. [d. at 2541. The Ordinance provided as follows:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to,
a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
[d.
64. [d.

65. [d. at 2547-49. The Justices who concurred in the Court's unanimous decision
opined that the ordinance was unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds. [d. at
2550, 2558-61 (opinions of White, Blackmun, and Stevens, 11., concurring).
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ment. Prior to enactment, the Guam statute's sponsor advocated
passage on the grounds that Guam is a Christian community. 66 After
the law was proposed, an "overwhelming majority" of those who
testified at a hearing on the law supported it on the grounds of
"religious belief or orientation. "67 The district court in Guam Society
oj Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada recognized the solicitation
provision discriminated on the basis of viewpoint when, without
elaboration, it relied on Texas v. Johnson to conclude that the
provision violated the First Amendment. 68
The crime of "criminal solicitation" encompasses requests and
encouragements to commit crimes. 69 The complaint filed against Ms.
Benshoof by the Attorney General of Guam alleged that:
On or about the 20th day of March, 1990, in the Territory
of Guam, Janet Benshoof did knowingly solicit a person or
persons to submit to an abortion in violation of 9 Guam
Code Annotated section 31.23, as amended. 70
The Affidavit of Probable Cause, which alleged that on March 20,
1990, Ms. Benshoof had addressed a gathering assembled at The
Press Club of Guam to discuss the signing of the law, asserted:
That during her presentation Ms. Benshoof indicated that
she was aware that Guam's Anti-Abortion law prohibited
the solicitation of pregnant women interested in getting
abortions by advising them where they could obtain abortions.
That in the presence of members of the Guam Press Club
and others attending this meeting, Ms. Benshoof publicly
encouraged women seeking abortions on Guam to have the
abortion and travel to Honolulu, Hawaii. She mentioned

66. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422, 1425
(D. Guam 1990) (Guam I).
67. Id. (quoting Committee Report on Bill No. 848). A chart, appended to the
Respondents' Ninth Circuit Brief in Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, summarized the oral legislative testimony on the law. The chart
identified the names 'of those people who testified and whether they favored
Bill 848, believed life begins at conception, and included religious references
in their testimonies. A second chart summarizing the written legislative testimony, also appended to the Respondents' Ninth Circuit Brief, was structured
in the same fashion as the chart summarizing oral testimony. The two charts
reflect the Committee Report finding.
68. Guam I, 776 F. Supp. at 1428, 1429 n.9 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 414 (1989».
.
69. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 110 (1989).
70. See Court File Criminal Case No. CM 0160-90 commenced in The Superior
Court of Guam.
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that there were places in Honolulu where women could
obtain low cost abortions. Benshoof then gave a telephone
number which women traveling to Honolulu to have abortions should call. 71
A March 21, 1990, memorandum by the Attorney General of
Guam stated that the solicitation provision prohibited "a medical
professional or any other person from recommending to a woman
that she seek an abortion in a location other than Guam by making
such recommendations a crime.' '72 Before turning to the constitutional
problems posed by the solicitation provision, it should be noted that,
in any case, prosecuting Ms. Benshoof was improper because her
actions did not constitute "criminal solicitation." Ms. Benshoof did
not engage in criminal solicitation because she did not request or
encourage anyone to obtain an elective abortion in Guam, but rather
advised women of where they could still go to obtain a legal elective
abortion. 73
The charge against Ms. Benshoof was unwarranted not only
because her actions did not constitute criminal solicitation, but also
because she could not have been convicted since the Guam law
violated the First Amendment. The solicitation provision was viewpoint based because it sought to regulate speech favorable to the
alternative of abortion. Speech dealing with abortion is of high value
because it is an essential part of the exposition of ideas with substantial social value as a step towards realizing the truth about a
highly controversial issue. 74 Particularly significant is the fact that by
71. Id.

72. Plaintiffs' Brief at 79 (quoting Attorney General's Memorandum), Guam Soc'y
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422 (D. Guam 1990).
73. It should be noted that if a particular behavior is constitutionally protected
then encouragement of that behavior would always or nearly always be protected as well. See GREENAWALT, supra note 69, at 280 n.34; see also Valley
Family Planning v. North Dakota, 489 F. Supp. 238, 242 (D.N.D. 1980) (if
government cannot interfere with or prohibit an activity, then it also cannot
regulate discussion relating to that activity), aff'd, 661 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1981).
From the noted principle, it necessarily follows that as long as Roe remains
the law a jurisdiction cannot prohibit the solicitation of abortion within that
jurisdiction even if that jurisdiction has declared abortion to be illegal. Even
if the Court abandons Roe, however, speech such as that of Ms. Benshoof is
protected both because of the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination and
other First Amendment doctrines.
74. The protection afforded particular speech by the First Amendment is contingent
upon whether that speech is of low or high First Amendment value. See Stone,
supra note 21, at 194-96. Low value speech is entitled to only limited constitutional protection. Id. at 194. Limitations on high value speech, which are
evaluated according to a more speech-protective analysis than restrictions on
low value speech, approach absolute protection. Id. at 196.
The distinction between low and high value speech was first recognized in
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discriminating on the basis of viewpoint, the Guam statute substantially impaired the communication of information relating to the
option of abortion.7s
The law discriminated on the basis of viewpoint because it sought
to remove from public debate only the message that abortion is an
alternative to childbirth. The Supreme Court has stated that "debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open .... "76
The solicitation provision precluded such debate on the alternative
of abortion, mutilated "the thinking process of the community,"
and conflicted with the values sought to be advanced by the First
Amendment. 77 There was no "equality of status in the field of ideas"
because the only message that could be presented was that childbirth
was preferable to abortion. 78
The law's restriction on speech was contrary to the three purposes
commonly associated with First Amendment jurisprudence. 79 First,

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

the dicta of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), where the
Court noted: "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech ...
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." [d. at 194
(citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72). Professor Stone has noted that the
precise factors that cause .particular classes of speech to fall within the realm
of low value speech is somewhat obscure. See Stone, supra note 21, at 194.
Certain categories of speech, however, are of low value because they are viewed
as not furthering the underlying purposes of the First Amendment. /d. Classes
of speech receiving only low value protection are words of incitement, false
statements, obscenity, commercial speech, fighting words, and child pornography. [d. at 194-95.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in R.A. V. v. City oj St. Paul indicated
that "a limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our
First Amendment jurisprudence." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538,
2543 (1992). Despite that observation, Justice White, in his concurring opinion,
argued that the majority had "cast£) aside" any notion of a categorical
approach to analyzing free speech questions. [d. at 2551-54 (White, J., concurring). The majority opinion also caused Justice Blackmun to conclude that
if categorization is now forbidden, then protection of speech interests will be
reduced "across the board." [d. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring). For
Justice Stevens, the majority had "revise[d)" a categorical approach which he
regarded as "unsound." [d. at 2562, 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens' primary criticism was that the categorical approach failed to seriously
account for the importance that context plays in evaluating free speech issues.
[d. at 2566. Additionally, Justice Stevens opined that categorization seeks to
superimpose straight and unwavering dividing lines when free speech matters
do not lend themselves to such treatment. [d.
See supra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (holding that actual
malice must be shown before damages can be awarded in a libel action brought
by a public official).
See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
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the citizenry could not make informed choices when it was precluded
from hearing speech offering abortion as an alternative to childbirth,
thus stifling the self-governing purpose. 80 Second, the "search for
the truth" about the option of abortion versus childbirth was undermined since there was an inhibited marketplace of ideas devoid
of the competition envisioned by Justice Holmes. 8' Third, the restriction deprived individuals of the opportunity to promote their sense
of self-worth by removing the abortion alternative from public discourse, thereby restraining people from exercising their rational capacities. 82
Especially significant is the fact that the Court has stated that
within the uninhibited marketplace of 'ideas secured by the First
Amendment, the public is entitled "to receive suitable access to
social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences .... ' '83 The subject of abortion is one of the most widely
debated social and moral issues today, evoking strong sentiments
from those on both sides of the issue. 84 Guam's law, as evidenced
by the grounds for bringing the charges against Ms. Benshoof and
by the Attorney General's memorandum, sought to advance the
viewpoint that abortion is a social and moral evil, while prohibiting
discussion of the opposing view. 8s The law was motivated by the fact
that Guam is a Christian community, and the law's pronouncements
were regarded as consistent with the "religious belief or orientation"
of its population. 86 This justification is not the sort of compelling

80, See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
83. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969) (emphasis added)
(addressing constitutionality of the FCC fairness doctrine); see also Vincent
Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 460 (1985) (noting that the communication of a fact or value
judgment relating to a matter of public concern cannot be prohibited solely
on the grounds that it erodes moral standards).
84. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 571 & n.16
(1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the intensely divisive character of
much of the national debate on abortion reflects deeply held religious convictions yet religious organizations submitted amicus briefs on both sides of the
abortion issue).
85. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. The predominant religious affiliation in Guam is Catholic. Lewin, supra note 4. When the law was being
debated, the Archbishop threatened to excommunicate any Catholic legislator
who voted against it. Id. This sort of action by Catholic authorities is of
particular significance when viewed in light of that portion of Justice Stevens'
dissent in Webster which addressed Missouri's declaration that the life of all
human beings commences at conception. Although other members of the Court
who voted to uphold the Missouri law declined to reach the validity of that
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governmental interest that should serve as the basis for viewpoint
discrimination. Such discrimination should fall when subjected to
strict scrutiny because the public is entitled to access to discourse
concerning social and moral ideas and experiences. 87
For example, despite the fact that racial discrimination is viewed
as offensive by the vast majority of people, the Court has not sought
to insulate that view from being tested in the marketplace of ideas. 88
The Court has gone so far as to find in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul
that although society has a compelling interest in eradicating forms
of discrimination with a long history, including racial discrimination,

declaration, see Webster, 492 U.S. at 507, 523, 532, Justice Stevens argued
that such a pronouncement violated the Establishment Clause because there
was no secular purpose and was an unequivocal endorsement of a religious
tenet of some, but not all Christian faiths. [d. at 566 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2839 (1992) (stating that for a state's interest in potential human life
to be legitimate it must be secular and consistent with the First Amendment
in not promoting a theological or sectarian interest) (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting); id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (the
Establishment Clause precludes a state's interest in potential life from being
theological or sectarian). But cj. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318-20 (1980)
(the fact that the Hyde Amendment's· abortion funding restrictions coincide
with Roman Catholic Church's religious tenets, without more, does not contravene the Establishment Clause).
Guam's solicitation provision ran afoul of not only the Free Speech Clause,
but also the Establishment Clause because it lacked a secular purpose and
endorsed Catholic religious tenets. This is true, despite the Court's recent
emphasis upon evaluating Establishment Clause claims according to a coercion
test. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992). Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter adhere to the view that proof of government
coercion is not a necessary prerequisite for demonstrating an Establishment
Clause violation and endorsement is an appropriate criterion for assessing
claims advanced under that clause. [d. at 2664, 2671-72, 2676-77 (opinions of
Blackmun and Souter, JJ.). Although Justice Kennedy has emphasized the role
of coercion, see id. at 2655, and has disapproved of employing endorsement
as a barometer for evaluating Establishment Clause challenges, see County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring and
dissenting), he has also indicated his belief that government cannot engage in
efforts to proselytize on behalf of religion, see id. at 664. The effort to prohibit
speech that conflicts with Catholic tenets, in order to advance those tenets,
should be viewed as a form of proselytization.
87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
88. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,418 (1989) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969»; see also supra note 53 and cases cited therein; cj. Federal
Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 25665 (1986) (rejecting the notion that the Federal Election Commission had a
compelling interest to force compliance with federal statute prohibiting use of
corporate funds in connection with federal elections by Massachusetts Citizens
for Life when the speech that opposed abortion was core political speech).
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that such an interest must be achieved through means other than
laws that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. 89
Simply because abortion is morally offensive to certain segments
of the population does not constitute a compelling interest so as to
exempt its discussion from the scrutiny of the marketplace of ideas. 90
Even if, sometime in the future, preventing abortions is found to be
a compelling interest, adequate alternatives to viewpoint discriminatory laws such as education could further such an interesUI Guam's
89. 112 S. Ct. at 2549-50. The St. Paul Ordinance was not reasonably necessary
to accomplish the asserted compelling interests because the only interest served
by the viewpoint restriction was to display the city council's special hostility
towards certain forms of biases. [d.
90. Although the Guam law did not employ the phraseology "compelling interest"
in its Legislative Findings, see supra note 2, recent efforts aimed at restricting
abortion in other states have included use of such language as a portion of
their findings or purpose. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West Supp.
1992) (declared unconstitutional in Sojourner T. v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930
(E.D. La. 1991), a/I'd sub nom. Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th
Cir. 1992»; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301.1 (Supp. 1992). Guam argued before
the Ninth Circuit that its law sought to advance a "compelling interest." Guam
Soc'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 962 F.2d 1366, 1372-74 (9th
Cir.) (Guam II), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 633 (1992). In rejecting Guam's
assertion, the Ninth Circuit, in part, commented that "a view of the state's
interest in potential life as 'compelling' throughout pregnancy does not necessarily mean that it sweeps all other interests out of the way. There is a
countervailing right in issue here, although we find little reflection of it in
Guam's briefs." [d. at 1373 (footnote omitted).
In the Guam case, the Ninth Circuit also observed that there must be
limits to the ability of a state's interest in potential life, whether or not that
interest is compelling, to override all conflicting interests. [d. at 1373 n.9. That
observation is particularly appropriate in the context of prohibiting the solicitation of abortion, as the public is entitled to reasonable access to social and
moral ideas and experiences, therefore, any claim of a compelling interest
should fail. Also, government has a compelling interest not to violate the
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Doe V. Small, 934 F.2d 743, 770 (7th Cir.
1991) (citing Widmar V. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) to support finding
that display of sixteen pictures depicting Christ's life in city park violated
Establishment Clause), rev'd, 964 F.2d 611, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
(reversing granting of injunction on the grounds that it was overbroad in
prohibiting display of pictures by any group) (Cudahy, J., concurring, relying
on Widmar, while observing that compliance with the Establishment Clause is
a compelling state interest, id. at 625); Kaplan V. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d
[024, 1030 (2d Cir.) (display of menorah in City Hall Park violated Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1989). As previously discussed, see
supra note 86, prohibiting the solicitation of abortion also violates the Establishment Clause, and therefore, even a statement asserting that fetal protection
is a compelling interest does not validate prohibiting the solicitation of abortion.
91. Cf R.A.V. V. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549-50 (1992) (finding that
there were sufficient means, other than an ordinance which discriminated on
the basis of viewpoint, available to advance compelling interest of eradicating
discrimination).
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restriction on the discussion of the abortion option represented a
clear case of censorship that jeopardized the vitality of free speech
and that was "blatantly" viewpoint based.92
Since the Guam solicitation prohibition was viewpoint based,
the district court's reliance on Texas v. Johnson was well founded. 93
The law conflicted with the First Amendment since the Guam legislature attempted to silence speech favorable to the abortion option
because it disagreed with those espousing that view. 94 Just as those
who would prohibit flag burning were urged to redirect their efforts
to persuasion, so too should adherents of the view that abortion is
morally wrong channel their energies towards persuasion, which at
the same time respects the rights of others to disagree with their
view. 95 Such a view is in keeping with Justice Brandeis' admonition
that what should be fostered is more speech and not enforced
silence. 96
Efforts directed at prohibiting the solicitation of abortion are
neither novel nor confined to the Territory of Guam. The State of
Montana, for example, prohibits physicians, other persons, or facilities from engaging in solicitation or other forms of communication
the purpose of which is to invite, induce, or attract anyone to have
an abortion. 97 Montana's Code declares that the proscribed conduct
constitutes a misdemeanor. 98
Similarly, the State of Vermont has criminalized the furnishing
to the public, whether by print, writing, words or language, any
information or advice meant to cause or to facilitate the procurement
of an abortion. 99 The Vermont provision authorizes a maximum
prison term of ten years, while mandating a sentence of not less

92. ct. supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
94. Ct. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
95. Ct. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); supra note 57 and accompanying
text; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) in holding that the role of the First Amendment
is to assure the unfettered exchange of ideas for bringing about political and
social change).
96. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
97. The "[c]ontrol of [the] practice of abortion" is codified in MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-20-109 (1991). In particular, § 50-20-109(4) provides that: "No physician,
facility, or other person or agency shall engage in solicitation, advertising, or
other form of communication having the purpose of inviting, inducing, or
attracting any person to come to such physician, facility, or other person or
agency to have an abortion or to purchase abortifacients."
98. [d. § 50-20-109(5).
99. The "[a]dvertising or dealing in anything to cause miscarriage" is governed by
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 104 (Supp. 1991).
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than three years. IOO Likewise, the State of Louisiana prohibits the
placing or carrying of any advertisement relating to abortion services
through the publication of the availability of those services. 101 The
United States Virgin Islands forbids the creation of any public or
private organization or society for the purpose of soliciting candidates
for abortion. 102
The Guam solicitation provision is not the first to be declared
unconstitutional. In the 1980 case Leigh v. Olson,103 the United States
District Court for the District of North Dakota considered a challenge
to a North Dakota solicitation statute that prohibited physicians,
hospitals, or any other person from advertising or participating in
any form of communication whose purpose was to invite, induce, or
attract a woman to obtain an abortion. I04 The plaintiffs in Olson
were Dr. Richard Leigh, a gynecologist who performed abortions,

100. The text of VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,§ 104 (Supp. 1991), in its entirety, provides
that:
A person who knowingly causes to be made public by print, writing,
words or language that give any information where anything, or any
advice or information, may be obtained for the purpose of causing
or procuring the miscarriage of a pregnant woman, shall be imprisoned
not more than ten years nor less than three years. A person who sells
or gives away anything for the purpose of producing such miscarriage
shall be imprisoned not more than three years nor less than one year
and fined not more than $500.00 nor less than $200.00, or both.
101. The Louisiana prohibition against "[a)bortion advertising," found in LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 14:87.4 (West 1986), provides that:
Abortion advertising is the placing or carrying of any advertisement
of abortion services by the publicizing of the availability of abortion
services.
Whoever commits the crime of abortion advertising shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than one year or
fined not more than five thousand dollars, or both.
By proscribing the publicizing of the availability of abortion services through
the placing of any advertisement, the Louisiana statute appears to preclude
such actions as those of Ms. Benshoof in which she advised women of where
abortion remained legal.
102. The Virgin Islands statute, V.1. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 153 (Supp. 1992), is
captioned "[s)oliciting abortion prohibited." That section provides that: "No
public or private organization or society shall be created for the purpose of
soliciting candidates for abortion; however, this provision shall in no way be
construed to restrict the legitimate activities of the Family Planning Clinic
conducted by the Department of Health."
103. 497 F. Supp. 1340 (D.N.D. 1980).
104. [d. at 1342-43, 1350. Under N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-06 (1991), "[s)oliciting
abortions" was prohibited. That statute declared that: "No licensed physician
or licensed hospital, or any person employed by the licensed physician or
licensed hospital, nor any other person may advertise or participate in any
form of communication having as its purpose the inviting, inducing, or attracting of a pregnant woman to undergo an abortion."

1991]

Solicitation of Abortion

127

and Jane Bovard, a counselor who desired to furnish advice regarding
abortion to women in North Dakota. lOs
Initially, the district court found Dr. Leigh's providing of abortion services, his discussion about those services with patients, and
Ms. Bovard's counseling services, to constitute behavior prohibited
by the solicitation statute. 106 The court then indicated that the potential application of the statute was so broad that a person of ordinary
intelligence might not be able to determine whether particular conduct
or utterances were proscribed. I07 Because of these deficiencies, the
district court concluded the statute was so vague that it violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.lOs Although;?the district court stated that it was unnecessary to address whether the
statute violated the First Amendment, it noted "that the threat of
criminal sanctions for communications having as their purpose inviting, inducing or attracting a pregnant woman to undergo an abortion
would effectively deter the exercise of free speech." 109
In 1991, the Utah Legislature enacted laws limiting a woman's
right to obtain an abortion.110 These laws permitted abortion only
when a woman's life was threatened, when she would sustain grave
damage to her health, when the pregnancy was the result of rape or
incest, or when the child would be born with grave birth defects.111
Although the Utah laws did not contain a solicitation provision
similar to that employed in the Guam law, the possibility of someone
being charged in a situation similar to that of Ms. Benshoof has
surfaced as an issue. News media reports have included accounts that
the American Civil Liberties Union has expressed concerns that
individuals could be charged with solicitation if the new laws were
read in conjunction with Utah's general solicitation statute. ll2 Those
105. Olson, 497 F. Supp. at 1343. While neither plaintiff had engaged in advertising,
the district court noted if they had wished to have done so the State could not
have precluded such activity. [d. at 1350 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809 (1975» (see infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Bigelow).
106. Olson, 497 F. Supp. at 1350.
107. [d.
108. [d.
109. [d. (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967».
110. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-301.1(4) & 76-7-302 (Supp. 1992).
111. [d.
112. Legislature's Rush to Judgment Created Flawed Abortion Law, THE SALT LAKE
TRmuNE, Mar. 26, 1991, at A12 (editorial) [hereinafter LEGISLATURE'S RUSH];
Legislature Keeps Utah Fighting in Unnecessary Abortion Battle, THE SALT
LAKE TRmuNE, Apr. 21, 1991, at A16 (editorial). Criminal solicitation in Utah
is governed by UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-203 to 76-4-204 (Supp. 1992).
In a recent Utah case, which did not present the problem of someone who
was charged with solicitation, the district court rejected a free speech challenge
to Utah's abortion laws. The district court found that Utah's abortion laws
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concerns included the possibility of prosecutions for discussing abortion when the discussions focused on the possibility of accessing legal
abortion services in neighboring states.1I3
The fact that solicitation prohibitions and the controversy surrounding them have not been unique to Guam suggests that not only
Roe has been targeted by those who want government to reflect their
morality on the subject of abortion, but the First Amendment as
well, to the extent that it requires unfettered discussion on controversial subjects. Because some elected officials have been willing to
champion the view that their governments, as well as the entire
United States, can and should endorse laws that treat the availability
of abortion as a moral evil,1I4 the challenge to a woman's right to
choice under Roe has been expanded to include a challenge to the
First Amendment's free speech guarantees.
The promulgation of the regulations at issue in Rust v. Sullivan
is indicative of the generalized threat facing the free speech guarantees
of the First Amendment as a result of the moral debate surrounding
abortion. 1I5 In Rust, the United States Department of Health and
Human Services promulgated regulations restricting the activities of
Title X fund recipients as they related to the abortion alternative.1I6
The regulations prohibited recipients from counseling or providing
referrals for abortion as a method of family planning. ll7 Also,

113.
114.

115.
116.
117.

did not expose physicians, clergy, and counselors to accessorial liability for
engaging in abortion counseling. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537,
1547-48 (C.D. Utah 1992). In Bangerter, the court reasoned that under UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1990), accessorial liability was premised on aiding,
encouraging, or soliciting someone who is engaged in conduct that constituted
an offense, and physicians, clergy, and counselors were not engaged in conduct
declared to be illegal. [d.
Legislature's Rush, supra note 112, at A12.
See, e.g., DeBenedictis, supra note 16, at 20-21 (discussing federal district
courts' rulings on Guam and Pennsylvania abortion restrictions aimed at directly
challenging Roe); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West 1986 & Cum. Supp.
1992) (limiting permissibility of abortion to circumstances in which the woman's
life or fetus is endangered and when pregnancy is product of rape or incest)
(declared unconstitutional in Sojourner T. v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930 (E.D.
La. 1991), a/I'd sub nom. Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir.
1992»; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-301.1, 76-7-302 (Supp. 1992) (limiting availability of abortion to when the woman's life is threatened or when she will
sustain grave damage to her health, or the pregnancy results from rape or
incest, or a child would be born with grave birth defects).
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
[d. at 1764-66.
[d. at 1765. The issue of government prohibition of abortion counseling when
its resources are in some manner connected to health care providers has been
the subject of multiple journal articles. See Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, Note,
Title X, the Abortion Debate, and the First Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REv.
1737, 1737 (1990) (Title X regulations impose an unconstitutional condition on
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recipients were precluded from engaging in activities that encouraged,
promoted, or advocated abortion as a form of family planning. liS
The grantees in Rust challenged the regulations on the grounds
that they discriminated on the basis of viewpoint by prohibiting
discussion about abortion as a lawful option, while compelling the
provision of information that encouraged continuing a pregnancy to
term.1I9 The Court rejected the viewpoint discrimination challenge on
the grounds that government may choose to fund an activity it
believes to be in the public interest to the exclusion of other activities,
and that it is not required to subsidize the exercise of a right. 120 In
so holding, the Court noted that a basic difference exists between
direct state interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity that is consistent with legislative
policy. 121
The Rust decision, however, does not constitute authority favorable to upholding solicitation provisions such as Guam's law.
Prohibiting the solicitation of abortion is not linked in any manner
to government funding. Conversely, Rust does provide support for
the view that solicitation prohibitions violate the First Amendment,

118.
119.
120.

121.

grantees' First Amendment rights to engage in political advocacy of abortion
rights and to give medical advice about abortion); Carole I. Chervin, Note,
The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government Buy Up Constitutional Rights, 41 STAN. L. REV. 401, 410, 417 (1989) (Title X prohibition on
abortion counseling is content-based and viewpoint discriminatory); C. Andrew
McCarthy, Comment, The Prohibition on Abortion Counseling and Referral
in Federally-Funded Family Planning Clinics, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1181, 1205-06
(1989) (Title X prohibition on abortion counseling constitutes content restriction
and viewpoint discrimination); Janet Benshoof, The Chastity Act: Government
Manipulation of Abortion Information and the First Amendment, 101 HARV.
L. REv. 1916, 1922, 1932 (1988) (prohibition on abortion counseling to grantees
under Adolescent Family Life Act constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination); Theodore C. Hirt, Why the Government is Not Required to Subsidize
Abortion Counseling and Referral, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1895, 1900, 1909, 1914
(1988) (government can choose childbirth as preferred social policy and is not
required to subsidize abortion counseling under Adolescent Family Life Act);
see also Reproductive Health Servo V. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1077 (8th Cir.
1988) (addressing Missouri prohibition on use of public funds, public employees,
and public facilities to encourage or counsel a woman to have an abortion),
rev'd, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1765.
Id. at 1771-72.
Id. at 1772.
Id. Justice Blackmun dissented in Rust and expressed his view that the regulations discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. Id. at 1779-82 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). In Justice Blackmun's opinion, discrimination against a particular
ideological viewpoint is a repugnant ground for denying the granting of funds.
Id. at 1781-82. In Rust, Justice Blackmun found that the regulations were
viewpoint based because the Government was seeking to deny funding to
family-planning projects that advocated abortion, because they advocated abortion. /d. at 1781.

130

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 21

for such prohibitions do constitute direct state interference with
protected First Amendment speech dealing with abortion. Although
the Rust decision is not authority that favors upholding solicitation
prohibitions, it serves as evidence that free speech is at great risk in
the moral debate surrounding abortion. The Rust regulations reflect
certain elected officials' views that it is proper for government to
impede the exercise of the abortion option, because segments of the
population consider abortion morally reprehensible, even at the expense of the First Amendment. 122 Besides constituting unlawful viewpoint discrimination, the Guam solicitation law, and other efforts
like it, violate the First Amendment because they conflict with other
recognized First Amendment doctrines.

B.

Other Free Speech Problems Besides Viewpoint Discrimination

Beyond the viewpoint discrimination area, had Guam appealed
the invalidation of the solicitation provision, and had the Supreme
Court granted review and forsaken Roe, the solicitation provision
should still have been found to violate the First Amendment because
it conflicted with other well established First Amendment principles.
In Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University
of New York,123 the Court considered a New York motion picture
licensing law that provided that a license shall be issued unless a
movie was obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or was
of such character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals
or incite crime. The status of being immoral or of such character
that exhibition would tend to corrupt morals was defined as films
whose dominant purpose or effect was erotic or pornographic, which
portrayed acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or lewdness, or
122. Professor Blasi has authored a thesis that posits the existence of pathological
periods for First Amendment core values. Blasi, supra note 83. The thesis
proposes that at all times courts should "equip the first amendment to do
maximum service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox
ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely
to stifle dissent systematically." [d. at 449-50. The feature which characterizes
a period in time as being pathological is a shift in basic attitudes among certain
influential individuals, if not the public at large, regarding the desirability of
the central norms of the First Amendment. [d. at 467. The recent intolerance
displayed towards flag burning and restrictions imposed on speech dealing with
abortion suggest we are now in a pathological period. But see Mark V. Tushnet,
Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses,
27 WlJ!.. & MARY L. REv. 997, 1006-07 (1986) (criticizing the pathological
period analysis because substantial costs are imposed on courts by demanding
application of the restrictive doctrine when it is unnecessary and because it
erroneously assumes that the courts are sufficiently insulated from political
processes so as not to succumb to the accompanying political pressures).
123. 360 U.S. 684, 685 (1959).
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which expressly or impliedly presented such acts as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior .124
Kingsley was denied a license to distribute Lady Chatterley's
Lover because the theme of the picture was immoral, presenting
adultery as a desirable, acceptable, and proper pattern of behavior .125
The denial of the license was defended on the grounds that the
picture attractively portrayed a relationship that was contrary to the
moral standards, religious precepts, and legal code of New York's
citizens.126 The Court found that the denial of the license struck at
the heart of the First Amendment which is the freedom to advocate
ideas. 127 The fact that the picture advocated conduct proscribed by
law was not constitutional grounds for denying a license because
advocacy of proscribed conduct is not "a justification for denying
free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is
nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted
on. "128 The Court also noted that the deterrents employed to prevent
crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not
the abridgment of free speech. 129
The distinction between advocacy and incitement likely to result
in immediate lawless action was also the subject of the Court's
decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio.130 There the defendant was convicted of violating the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute for his
speech activities during a Ku Klux Klan rally. 131 The conviction was
reversed because the Ohio law prohibited mere advocacy that was
not also accompanied by incitement likely to culminate in imminent
lawless action.132
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

130.
131.

132.

[d. at 685.
[d.
[d. at 688.
[d.
[d. at 689 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring»; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).
Kingsley, 360 U.S. at 689 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. at 378
(Brandeis, J., concurring». In Kingsley, the Court also drew from Thomas
Jefferson noting that he wrote: "But we have nothing to fear from the
demoralizing reasonings of some if others are left free to demonstrate their
errors." Kingsley, 360 U.S. at 689 n.ll (quoting letter of Thomas Jefferson
to Elijah Boardman (July 3, 1801), JEFFERSON PAPERS, Library of Congress,
Vol. 115, folio 19761).
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
[d. at 444-47. The conviction in Brandenburg was premised on the defendant
"advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence,
or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform and for voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group, or
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal
syndicalism." [d. at 444-45 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13) (alterations in original).
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49.
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In the situation involving Ms. Benshoof, in which there was
nothing to suggest that the speech would have caused immediate
lawlessness, Guam, like New York in Kingsley and Ohio in Brandenburg, certainly attempted to prohibit advocacy relating to proscribed conduct that fell short of incitement. This is true because all
that Ms. Benshoof did was to inform women that abortion remained
legal in Hawaii, and to furnish a telephone number to be called
regarding abortion services there. Additionally, it is arguable whether
Ms. Benshoof's speech even constituted "advocacy" because she did
not facilitate illegal abortions in Guam. 133
The decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio is instructive also when
considered in the context of Professor Kent Greenawalt's analytical
approach to issues of criminal solicitation. Professor Greenawalt has
urged that when crimes of criminal solicitation are at issue, the degree
of protection afforded by the First Amendment should vary according
to whether the solicitation is private or public, and whether the
solicitation is ideological or nonideological. 134 Public and private
speech are distinguished from one another by the fact that public
speech involves the message being communicated in a manner in

133. Professor Barnes has indicated that when an underlying activity is prohibited,
government should be allowed to regulate speech likely to foster that unlawful
activity. Richard L. Barnes, Regulations of Speech Intended to Affect Behavior,
63 DENY. U. L. REv. 37, 39 (1985). Even if the Court were to adopt Professor
Barnes' view of the First Amendment, while abandoning Roe, government
should not be able to prohibit speech such as that of Ms. Benshoof, as she
did not furnish women with information pertaining to how to obtain an
abortion in Guam, but rather she merely informed them where they could go
to obtain legal abortions. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text. The
Commonwealth of Virginia's regulation of "[e]ncouraging or promoting abortion" appears to have been drafted in a manner consistent with Professor
Barnes' views. That statute provides that:
If any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale
or circulation of any publication, or through the use of a referral
agency for profit, or in any other manner, encourage or promote the
performing of an abortion or the inducing of a miscarriage in this
Commonwealth which is prohibited under this article, he shall be
guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-76.1 (Michie 1988) (emphasis added). It should be noted
that § 18.2-76.1 only bans the encouragement or promotion of an abortion in
Virginia and only then when that abortion would violate other limitations
imposed under Article 9, which governs abortion. Those other limitations
include: 1) requiring second trimester abortions be performed in a licensed
hospital; 2) requiring third trimester abortions be performed in a licensed
hospital and only allowing abortions to preserve the life and health of women
while also furnishing life support measures to be used if there is evidence of
viability; and 3) requiring written consent before performing an abortion. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-73, 18.2-74, 18.2-76 (Michie 1988).
134. See GREENAWALT, supra note 69, at 260-72.
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135
which its content can become known to a wide audience.
The
feature that characterizes non ideological solicitation is telling someone
that a particular act will benefit him or her .136 In contrast, ideological
solicitation is identified with telling someone that something is "his
duty or his right, or will be of broad benefit, or is warranted within
some overall philosophical understanding of human life and social
change."137
The constitutional protection afforded the different types of
solicitation lie along a continuum. At one end, where entitlement to
the greatest protection is located; lies public ideological solicitation,
and at the other end, where the least protection is afforded, is found
private nonideological solicitation. 138 Somewhere along the continuum
are private ideological solicitation and public nonideological solicitation.139
Public ideological solicitation has substantial expressive value,
demanding stringent requirements akin to those in Brandenburg v.
Ohio be satisfied before speech can be limited. l40 Punishment for
public ideological speech should only be allowed if it seriously
threatens the public interest. 141 The public interest is only seriously
threatened if a speaker steadfastly encourages the commission of a
specific crime, it is reasonably likely that the speech will contribute
to the commission of the crime, and that the crime will occur within
the very near future. 142 Occurrence of the crime within the very near
future is a requirement for punishing public ideological solicitation
because the opportunity exists for countervailing speech and for the
authorities to intercede to prevent the crime. 143
Less protection is afforded private ideological solicitation because
of the possibilities of overbearing influence and manipulation, the
small audience, and the unavailability of countervailing perspectives,144 Private ideological solicitation should not be punishable,
however, unless it presents a significant danger to persons or property.145 Public nonideological solicitation is also entitled to less protection because it is customarily associated with commercial speech.l46
Unlike public ideological solicitation, private nonideological solici135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 271.
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

271-72.
269.
269-71.
266, 268.
268.
266.
268.
269.
270.
270-71.
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tation has slight expressive value when compared to its potential
dangers and therefore punishing such speech does not impinge upon
free speech Iiberties. 147
Although Ms. Benshoof's speech did not constitute criminal
solicitation because she did not urge women to obtain abortions in
Guam,l48 even if her speech were scrutinized employing Professor
Greenawalt's descriptive categories, it would be considered to constitute protected public ideological solicitation. Clearly, her comments
constituted public speech because they were presented to a gathering
of the Guam Press Club and therefore were intended to be made
known to a substantial audience. Her comments were ideological
because they were designed to inform residents of Guam that although
Guam had limited the right to an abortion, another state, Hawaii,
still afforded women the right to choose to have an abortion. Also,
those comments were consistent with a philosophical perspective that
is integrated with the social ideology that women are entitled to
control their reproductive capacities.
The public interest was not seriously threatened but rather was
advanced because the public had a right to receive information
pertaining to social and moral issues. 149 Since no crime was encouraged, Ms. Benshoof's speech could not have reasonably contributed
to the commission of a specific crime, which would occur in the very
near future, through serious encouragement. Moreover, those who
disagree with Ms. Benshoof undoubtedly had the opportunity to
present their countervailing views. Even if Ms. Benshoof's comments
had been made in private, to one person, so as to constitute private
ideological solicitation, they would not have been punishable as there
would have been no danger, significant or otherwise, to persons or
property. 150
This situation can be analogized to the events in Texas v.
Johnson.151 Prior to the flag burning that occurred in Johnson,
demonstration participants marched through Dallas streets chanting
political slogans, stopped at corporations to stage "die-ins" to dram147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 264.

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 83 & 87 and accompanying text.
Danger to persons is, and should be, limited to persons who already have been
born. This Article will not venture into the moral debate, which fuels the
abortion controversy, whether a fetus is a person because it is irrelevant to the
First Amendment issues presented by prohibiting the solicitation of abortion.
Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2806 (1992) (although some members of the Court find abortion morally
offensive, that sentiment cannot control the Court's decision because its obligation is to define the liberty of all and not to mandate a particular moral
code) Uoint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
151. 491 U.S. 397 (1989); see supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
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atize the consequences of nuclear war, defaced the walls of buildings,
and overturned potted plants. IS2 At the conclusion of those activities,
Johnson ignited a flag that had been stolen from a flagpole outside
one of the targeted buildings. lS3 Although no one was physically
injured or threatened with injury, several witnesses testified that they
had been seriously offended by the flag burning. ls4
The State of Texas not only defended the statute on the grounds
that it sought to preserve the flag as a symbol of national unity, it
also asserted ari interest in preventing breaches of the peace. ISS The
Court found that prevention of breaches of the peace was not
implicated by the facts in Johnson.ls6 Also, the Court rejected the
State's invitation to assume that every expression of a provocative
idea will incite a riot, and concluded that the events surrounding the
flag burning did not constitute incitement likely to produce imminent
lawless action.1S7 Certainly, if the actions of Johnson and the other
demonstrators were not likely to result in a riot, and thereby did not
constitute incitement likely to result in imminent lawlessness, then
Ms. Benshoof's speech, wherein she merely apprised women of where
elective abortions remained legal, cannot be prohibited.
Although government can prohibit certain conduct, it cannot
punish speech dealing with that conduct. For example, in Bowers v.
Hardwick ls8 the Supreme Court upheld Georgia's sodomy statute,
concluding that there was no fundamental liberty interest to engage
in consensual homosexual activity. The decision in Bowers should be
contrasted with the decision of the Tenth Circuit in National Gay
Task Force v. Board oj Education oj Oklahoma City,1S9 which held
that public school teachers cannot be terminated for advocating repeal
of the State's sodomy law. l60 The Eighth Circuit's decision in Gay
& Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn l61 reflects a similar commitment
by holding that the Gay and Lesbian Students Association at the
University of Arkansas at Fayetteville could not be refused funding

152. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399. The defendant, Johnson, however, did not participate
in the noted activities. [d.
153. [d.
154. [d.
155. [d. at 400.
156. [d. at 407-09.
157. [d. at 409 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969».
158. 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
159. 729 F.2d 1270; 1274-75 (10th Cir. 1984), a/I'd per curiam, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
While finding the proscription against advocating, encouraging, or promoting
homosexual activity was overbroad, the court noted that statements "which
are aimed at legal and social change, are at the core of First Amendment
protections." [d. at 1274.
160. [d. at 1274-75.
161. 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988).

136

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 21

by the Student Senate because of views it espoused regarding homosexuality.162 By applying the reasoning that government can proscribe particular conduct, but not speech involving that conduct, it
follows that the charges brought against Ms. Benshoof violated the
First Amendment. 163
No matter the fate of Roe, speech such as that engaged in by
Ms. Benshoof cannot be prohibited under Bigelow v. Virginia. l64
Bigelow was a director and editor of a weekly Virginia newspaper
that published an advertisement from a New York organization that
informed readers that abortion remained legal in New York.165 Criminal charges were brought against Bigelow for violating a Virginia
statute that prohibited encouraging or promoting the procurement of
an abortion through publication, lecture, advertisement or by the
sale or circulation of any publication. l66 The Court concluded that
the statute violated the First Amendment, holding that a state cannot
prohibit an individual from disseminating information about an
activity declared as illegal there, but which is legal in another state. 167
Like Bigelow, Ms. Benshoof merely informed others about where
elective abortions continued to be ·legal. Such speech is therefore
protected by the First Amendment. l68 In addition, speech such as

162. [d. at 367-68. In granting the Gay and Lesbian Students Association relief
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Judge Arnold noted that:
[S]odomy is illegal in Arkansas. However, the GLSA does not advocate
sodomy, and even if it did, its speech about an illegal activity would
still be protected by the First Amendmen~. People may extol the
virtues of arson or even cannibalism. They simply may not commit
the acts. Thus, we reverse the District Court on the First Amendment
issue. Conduct may be prohibited or regulated, within broad limits.
But government may not discriminate against people because it dislikes
their ideas, not even when the ideas include advocating that certain
conduct now criminal be legalized.
[d. at 368.
163. Additional support for the position discussed can be found in Musser v. Utah,
333 U.S. 95 (1948). There, the defendants were convicted of conspiring to
commit acts injurious to public morals through their counseling or advising on
polygamy. [d. at 96 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 103-11-1 (1943». The Court
did not address the constitutionality of the statute, but vacated the judgment
and remanded the case to the state court to interpret the statute that gave rise
to the prosecutions. [d. at 95-98. Justice Rutledge, in dissent, would have
reversed the convictions and observed that the "extreme position, that the state
may prevent any conduct which induces people to violate the law, or any
advocacy of unlawful activity, cannot be squared with the First Amendment."
[d. at 102.
164. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
165. [d. at 811-12.
166. [d. at 812-13 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1960».
167. [d. at 824-25.
168. Cj. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-08, 529 n.3 (1965) (While the
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that of Ms. Benshoof is entitled to even greater protection than that
in Bigelow because her speech was not commercial in nature. 169
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Guam solicitation provISIon discriminated on the basis of
viewpoint because speech that favored the exercise of the option of
abortion was prohibited while speech opposing that alternative was
not barred. Such discrimination manifested itself in the charges
brought against Ms. Benshoof. Besides the fatal viewpoint discrimination, the prosecution of Ms. Benshoof violated the First Amendment, no matter the fate of Roe, because: (1) her speech did not
constitute incitement likely to result in immediate lawlessness, (2)
government cannot punish speech dealing with prohibited conduct,
and (3) the First Amendment precludes a jurisdiction from prohibiting
the furnishing of information regarding an activity declared as illegal
there, but which is legal in another jurisdiction.
Any assertion that the government has a compelling interest in
perpetuating the view that abortion is morally wrong should be
rejected because the values underlying the First Amendment mandate
that the public have suitable access to all information relating to
social and moral questions. Because efforts to limit the solicitation
of abortion have not been confined to Guam, it is evident that the
free speech guarantees of the First Amendment are at substantial
risk. To the extent that governments and their leaders may be willing
to champion the prohibition of the solicitation of abortion, the First
Amendment is in jeopardy of becoming a casualty of the moral
debate surrounding abortion. Courts should remain mindful of Justice
Kennedy's observation in Lee v. Weisman that "[t]o endure the
speech of false ideas or offensive content and then to counter it is
part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society, a society which
insists upon open discourse towards the end of a tolerant citizenry." 170
Hopefully, the values animating the First Amendment will prevail in
any future controversies that may arise involving abortion solicitation
prohibitions.

statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptives and the aiding of their use should
have been held constitutional, speech or advocacy dealing with contraception,
without affirmative conduct directed at violating the statutes, were protected
by the First Amendment.) (Black and Stewart, 11., dissenting).
169. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983)
(holding that the Constitution accords less protection to commercial speech
than other constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression).
170. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992).
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